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gence on his part." 36  This doctrine seems
to have been very generally accepted and
adopted. 37  In Mississippi, the court say
pithily : 'Whatever is sufficient to put a party
upon inquiry amounts in equity to notice."
3 8
Whether the subsequent purahaser has made
due inquiry is a question of fact for the jury;
and with a view to its determination, the in-
formation obtained by him may be proved,
though it can not be used to bear upon the
question whether or not there was such a
deed.3 9  Wat. L. MURFREE, JR.
St. Louis, Mo.
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2 Johns. Ch. 182.
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PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW.
It is to be observed, in the first place, that
the courts will take judicial notice of: 1. The
law of nations.1  2. The law merchant. 2  3.
The maritime law, so far at least as recog-
nized by the law of nations.3 4. The eccle-
siastical law, for the purpose of determining
how far it is a part of the common law."
.5. The courts of a State which has been
carved out of another State, take judicial
notice of the statutes of the latter State,
passed prior to the separation.b In ac-
cordance with this principle, the Supreme
Court of the United States has taken judicial
notice of the Spanish laws prevailing in Lou-
I The Scotia. 14 Wall, 171, 188.
2Edie v. East India Co., 2 Burr. 1226; Jewell v.
-Center, 25 Ala. 498; Bradford v, Cooper, 1 La. Ann.
825; Goldsmith v. Sawyer, 46 Cal. 209.
3 Chandler v. Grieves, 2 H. Bt. 606n; Maddox v.
Fisher, 14 Moore, P. C. 103; Zugasti v. Lamer, 12
Moore P. C. 331; The Scotia, 14 Wall. 171, 188; Tay-
lor on Ev., sec. 6; Wharton on Ev., sec. 208.
4 Sims v. Marryatt, 17 Q. B. (79 E. C. L.) 292; Roll.
Abr. 526; 6 Vin. Abr. 496.
5 Delano v. Jopling, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 417; Stokss v.
Macker, 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 145; Doe v. Eslava, 11 Ala,
1028; Chouteau v. Pierre, 9 Mo. 3,; Ott v. Soulard, 9
Mo. 681.
isiana before the cession of that territory to
this government, and upon which laws titles
to land in that State depended. 6 And, in a
more recent case, in a circuit court of the
United States, the title to lands in Texas be-
ing involved, the question having arisen
whether the laws of Tamaulipas, in whose
limits the premises in question formerly lay,
must be proven or could be judicially noticed,
it was held by Mr. Justice Bradley, that ju-
dicial notice would be taken of them, on the
ground that the former laws of a country
still affecting its landed estates are to be re-
garded as domestic and not foreign laws.7
6. All courts take judicial notice of their do-
mestic law.8 And the common law of a
State which had no political existence before
the Revolution, is the common law as modi-
fied and amended by English statutes passed
prior to the Revolution. 9 But it is held that,
in those States whose colonies were established
before the Revolution, with a power to legis-
late for themselves, English statutes passed
after the colonies were thus established., but
prior to the Revolution, are not a part of their
common law. 7. The State courts take ju-
dicial notice of the Federal Constitution, and
of its amendments," as well as of Federal
statutes.12 8. The Federal courts take ju-
dicial notice of the laws of the several States
composing the national government.13 "It
can never be maintained in the courts of the
United States," said Mr. Chief-Justice Taney,.
"that the laws of any State of this Union are
to be treated as the laws of a foreign na-
6 United States v. Turner, 11 How. 663, 668.
7 City of Brownsville v. Cavazos, 2 Woods, 293,
8 State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309; State v. O'Conner, 1t
La. Ann. 486; Pierson v. Baird, 2 Greene (Iowa),
235; Berliner v. Waterloo, 14 Wis. 378; Springfield
v. Worcester, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 52; Division of Howard
County, 15 Kan, 194; Dolph v. Barney, 6 Oregon,191.
9Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147; Dutcher v. Cul-
ver, 24 Minn. 584.
lSackett v. Sackett, 8 Pick. 3q8, 816; Common-
wealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 534.
11 Graves v. Keaton, 3 Coldw. (43 Tein.) 8.
12 Kessel v. Albetis, 66 Barb. 362; Papin v. Ryan,
32 Mo. 21; Morris v. Davidson, 49 Ga. 361; Rice's
Succession, 21 La. Ann. 614, 616; Bayley v. Chubb,
16 Gratt. 284; Minis v. Swartz, 37 Tex. 13; Jones v.
Laney, 2 Tex. 342; Semple v. Hagar, 27 Cal. 163;
United States v. DeCoursey, 1 Pion. 608; Montgom-
ery v. Deeley, 3 Wis. 709, 712.
injunction Railroad Co. v. Bank of Ashland, 12
Wall. 226, 229; Bennett v. Bennett, Deady, 29a,
811; Merrill v. Dawson, Hemp. 563; Smith v. Tal-
lapoosaCo., 2 Woods, 574, 576.
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tion." 14 And the principle was authorita-
tively determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1835, when Mr. Justice
Story declared: "We are of opinion that the
circuit court was bound to take judicial notice
of the laws of Louisiana. The circuit courts
of the United States are created by Congress,
not for the purpose of administering the local
laws of a single State alone, but to adminis-
ter the laws of all the States in the Union to
which they respectively apply. The judicial
power conferred on the general government
by the Constitution extends to many cases
arising under the laws of the different States,
and this court is called upon, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, constantly to
take notice of, and administer the j urispru-
dence of all the States. That jurispru-
dence is then, in no just sense, foreign
jurisprudence, to be proved to the courts of
the United States by the ordinary modes of
proof by which the laws of a foreign country
are to be established, but is to be judicially
taken notice of in the same manner as the
laws of the United States are taken notice of
by these courts."' 15
In the second place, we notice that the
courts will not take judicial notice of the laws
of foreign States. 16 As Lord Langdale said
in England: "With foreign laws an lEnglish
judge can not be familiar; there are many of
which he must be totally ignorant; there is in
every case of foreign law an absence of all the
acelrate knowledge and ready associations
which assist him in the consideration of that
which is the English law." 17 And as Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall said in this country: "The
laws of a foreign nation, designed only for the
direction of its own affairs, are not to be no-
ticed by the courts of other countries, unless
proved as facts." 18 Neither will the courts of
one State take judicial notice of the laws of
any other State; and this upon the theory
14 United States v. Turner, 11 How. 663, 668.
15 Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 507.
16 Freemoult v. Dedire, 1 P. Wins. 480; Feaubert
Y. Turst, Pre. Ch. 207; Mostyn v. Farrigas, Cowp.
174; Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. 163; Smith v. Gould, 4
Moore P. C. 21; Strothen v. Lucas, 6 Pet. 768; Arm-
strong v. Lear. 8 Pet. 52; United States Y. Wiggins,
14 Pet. 335; Damess v. Hale, 1 Otto, 13; Bowditch V.
Soltyk, 99 Mass. 138; Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147; Hos-
ford v. Nichols, 1 Paige, 220; McCraney v. Alden, 46
Barb. 274.
17 Nelson v. Bridport, 8 Beav. 527.
18 Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Crancb, 38.
that the separate States, which together con-
stitute the nation, are, as respects their polit-
ical relations to each other, essentially
foreign countries, whose laws must be proven-
as facts. 19 But it was held in Vermont, at an
early day, that the courts would take judicial
notice of the laws of sister States. 20 But that
doctrine has been overruled in subsequent
cases in the same court. 21 In an early case
in New Jersey, a similar doctrine was inti-
mated, 22 but the dicta in that case have alsY
been overruled in later cases. 23  A similar
theory was taken at an early day in Tennes-
see, and has ever since been maintained in
that State.2 ' And now, under the Code of'
the State, the Supreme Court takes judicial
notice of all foreign laws and statutes. 25 In
a recent case in Rhode Island, the court took
judicial notice of a law of the State of New
York.2 1  In a case in Pennsylvania it was
held that a State court, when its judgment
would be liable to review by the Supreme
Court of the United States in a case arising
under the law of a sister State, would take-
judicial notice of such law. 27 "A judgment
of this court," so runs the opinion, "arising
out of the Federal Constitution and legisla-
tion, would be reviewable in the Supreme
Court of the United States, and there the
States of the Confederacy are not regarded
as foreign States whose laws and usages must,
be proved, but as domestic institutions, whose
laws are to be noticed without pleading or
proof. It would be an imperfect and dis-
1s Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382; Mobile R. Co. V.
Whitney, 39 Ala. 468; Forsyth v. Preer, 62 Ala. 443;
Newton v. Coeke, 10 Ark. 169: Hempstead v. Reed, 6.
Conn. 480; Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517: Dyer v.
Smith, 12 Conn. 384; Bailey v. McDowell, 2 Harring-
ton, 84; Stanford v. Pruet, 27 Ga. 243; Mason V.
Wash, Breese, 39: Irving v. McLean, 4 Blackf. 52;
Davis v. Rogers, 14 Ind. 424: Johnson v. Chambers, 12
Ind. 112; Carey v. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co., 5 Iowa,
357; Taylor v. Runyan, 9 Iowa, 522; Shed v. August-
ine, 14 Kan. 292; Tyler v. Trabue, s u. Mon. 306;
Syme v. Stewart, 17 La. Ann. 73; Legg v. Legg, 8
Mass. 99; Hoyt v. McNeil. 13 Minn. 390; Babcock v.
Babcoek, 46 Mo. 243; Ball v. Consolidated, etc. Co.,
32 N. Y. Law, 102, 104; Anderson v. Andersov, 2&
Texas, 639.
2Middlebury Coll. v. Cheney, 1 Vt. 348.
21Ferritt v. Woodruff, 19 Vt. 182; Woodrow v.
O'Ccnnor, 28 Vt. 776.
22 Curtis v. Martin, 1 Pennington, (N. J.) 290.
23 Van Buskirk v. Mulock, 3 Harrison, 184.
24 Foster v. Taylor, 2 Overton, 191; Coffee v. Neely,
2 Heisk. 311; Hobbs v. Railroad Co., 9 Heisk. 873.
25 Hobbs v. Memphis, etc. R. Co. 56 Tenn. 874.
2 Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co., 11 R. 1. 411.
27 State v. Hinchman, 27 Pa. St. 479.
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,cordant administration for the court of orig.
inal jurisdiction to adopt one rule of decision,
while the court of final resort was controlled
by another; and hence it follows that in a
-question of this sort we should take notice of
the local laws of a sister State in the same.
manner as the Supreme Court of the United
.,States would do on a writ of error to a j udg-
ment." This case has been severely criti-
,cised in Wisconsin. 28 In Kansas it has been
teld that the Constitutions of sister States
will be judicially noticed. 29 An', it has been
held in the Supreme Court of the United
States that,where a State recognizes acts done
in pursuance of the laws of another State,
-the courts of the first State should take ju-
dicial cognizance of the said laws so far as
may be necessary to judge of the acts alleged
-to be done under them. 30  A distinction is
taken between the written and the unwritten
law, and, while the latter may be proven by
the testimony of experts, the former can only
be shown by the production of the written
Jaw itself, duly authenticated. The unwritten
law may be proven by parol,31 while-the writ-
ten law must be produced.32 In an early case,
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said: "That no
testimony shall be received which pre-sup-
poses better testimony attainable by the party
who offers it, applies to foreign law as it does
to all other facts." 11 Upon this principle
,the statute itself must be regarded as better
evidence of what it contains,than is the testi-
mony of any individual who, though he may
know the general purport of the law, may not
carry in his mind so minute and exact a
knowledge thereof as is often necessary for
28 Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328.
29 Butcher v. Bank, 2 Kan. 70; Dodge v. Coffin, 15
Ran. 277.
20 Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall. 513.
91 Baltimore, etc. it. Co. v. Glenn, 28 Aid. 287; He-
berd v. Myers, 5 Ind. 94; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich.
.349; Merritt v. Merritt, 20 Il. 65; Ennis v. Smith, 14
H1ow. (U. S.) 400, 426; McRae v. Mattoon, 13 Pick.
53; Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147,151; Tyler Y. Trabue,
8 B. Mon. 306.
32 Zimmerman Y. Hesler, 32 Md. 274; Kiermott T.
Ayer, 11 Mich. 181; Woodbridge v. Austin, 2 Tyler,
364; Danforth v. Reynolds, 1 Vt, 265; Territt v. Wood-
-ruff, 19 Vt. 184. McNeill v, Arnold, 17 Ark. 154, 167;
Bowles v. Eddy, 33 Ark. 645; Emery v. Berry, 8 Fos-
ter, 473; Comparet v. Jernegan, 5 Blackf. 375; Hoes
v. Van Alstyne, 20 Ill. 202; MeDeed v. McDeed, 67
.111. 545; Lee v. Matthews, 10 Ala. 682; Ennis v. Smith,
15 How. 400; Spaulding v. Vincent, 24 Vt. 501, 505;
Isabella v. Pecot, 2 La. Ann. 3S7; Bryant v. Kelton,
I Tex. 434.
U Church v. Hubbard, 2 Cranch, 187.
its proper application. In reference to this
distinction between the written and unwritten
law as to modes of proof, it is important to
observe that the courts have held that, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it will
be presumed that the foreign law is unwrit-
ten, and that parol evidence will be received
upon this assumption.34
While the general rule excludes, in this
country, the testimony of witnesses as to the
written or statutory law, yet such testimony
has been received when the question was, not
so much as to the language of the written
law, but as to what was the law altogether as
shown by its exposition, interpretation and
adjudication. In admitting such testimony
in Alabama as to the law of Louisiana, the
court said: "The exposition, interpretation
and adjudication may never have been evi-
denced by books or writings; but may, nev-
ertheless, have become well understood, as
the rule of law deduced by the court from
the written words of the Code upon a particu-
lar state of facts. Upon such a question,
the testimony or opinions of competent wit-
nesses, instructed in the law of that State,
may be resorted to." 35 In another case it is
held that while the statute of a foreign State
can not be proved by parol, yet the construc-
tion given to such statutes by the tribunals
where they are in force, may be given in evi-
dence by witnesses learned in such laws. 36
And the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has
recently permitted a Spaniard, formerly of
Havana, to testify that a verbal partnership
was valid under the laws of Cuba; that he
might state the written law without producing
it.3 7 The court declared that, in the case of
the Spanish colonies, it was difficult to ascer-
tain what their law was without the aid of an
expert, their law being composed partly of
the various codes of Spain, and partly of the
various decrees contained in the Recopilacion
de Indiaq, and the various decrees of later
date. In the course of its decision the court
say: "There are many cases where the evi-
idence of a professional person, or one skilled
virtute offlQii, may be much more satisfactory
evidence of what the law is, than the mere
34 Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 S.& R. 84, 87; Livingstan
v. Maryland Ins. Co.. 6 Cranch, 274, 280.
M Walker v. Forbes, 31 Ala. 9.
36 Hoes v. Van Alstyne, 20 Ill. 202.
37 Barrows v. Downs, 9 R. 1. 453.
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exemplification of the exact words of a for-
eign statute, which the court may not have
the necessary knowledge to construe. And
it seems to us that the requiring an exempli-
fied copy is pressing the rule of requiring the
best evidence to an extent that would often
defeat the ends of justice." Chancellor
Kent, in an early case, also permitted a Span-
ish lawyer to testify that a will was executed
according to the laws of Cuba, without the
production of the written law. 38 And re-
cently, in Pennsylvania, a witnesss was
permitted to testify as to the laws of Ba-
den, though his testimony involved a stat-
ute. 39 So, in a late case in Maryland, a New
York lawyer was held competent to testify, in
the absence of opposing proof, whether a sale
made by. a receiver was made after due public
notiae and advertisement as required by the
laws of New York. 40  In other cases, too, in
this country, experts have been allowed to
testify as to the law of another State, where a
statute and its construction has been in-
volved.4 1 But in England the ,ule is well
settled, and has been since 1845, that parol
testimony may be reeeived as to foreign law,
even though the law be written. Law is consid-
ered as a complex resultant of the written law
and its interpretation and construction. In
Baron De Bode's case, 42 Lord Chief Justice
Denman said: "There is another general rule;
that the opinions of persons of science must be
received as to the facts of their science. That
rule applies to the evidence of legal men, and
I think it is not" confined to .unwritten law,
but extends also to the written laws which
such men are bound to know. Properly
speaking, the nature of such evidence is not
to set forth the contents of the written law,
but its effect and the state of the law result-
ing from it. The mere contents, indeed,
might often mislead persons not familiar with
the particular system of law. The witness is
called upon to state what law does result
from the evidence." The same principle is
laid down in Earl Nelson v. Lord Bridport,
43
8 In the matter of Robert's Will, 8 Paige, 446.
89 Am. Life Ins., etc. Co. v. Rosenagle, 27 P. F.
Smith, 507.
40 Consolidated Real Estate and Fire Ins. Co. v.
Cashew, 41 Md. 59.
41 Hooper v. Moore. 5 Jones Law (N. C.), 130; Bark-
man v. Hopkins, 6 Eng. (Ark.) 17.
42 8 Ad. & Ellis (N. S.), 208.
48 8 Beav. 527.
where the court declares that, although the-
written law is produced, and due proof made
that it has not been repealed, varied or fallen
into disuse, and that the words have been ac-
curately translated, "still the words require
due construction, and the construction de-
pends on the meaning of the words to be con-
sidered with reference to other words not
contained in the mere text of the law, and
also with reference to the subject-matter,
which is not insulated from all others. The
construction may have been, probably has.
been, the subject of judicial decision ; instead
of one decision, there may have been a long
succession of decisions, varying more or less
from each other, and ultimately ending in that
which alone ought to be applied in the par-
ticular case." As Lord Brougham said in
the Sussex Peerage Case," "it is perfectly
clear that the proper mode of proving a for-
eign law is not by showing to the House the
book of the law; for the House (of Lords),
has not organs to know and to deal with the
text of that law, and therefore requires the
assistance of a lawyer who knows how to in-
terpret it."
When it is desired to prove the language of
the written law by the production of the stat-
ute, it is evidently necessary that the statute
should be authenticated or verified in some
manner. In most of the States provision has
been made by statute, and books purporting
to contain the laws of a sister State, and to be
published by authority of such State, may be
received as prima Jacie evidence of the laws
of such State. 45 And such books have been
received in the absence of any statute autho-
rizing it. One of the earliest reported cases
on this subject is that of Thompson v. Mus-
ser,4 6 in which the right to use such a book
as evidence of the law was sustained. "I
admit," said McKean, C. J., "that this
printed copy of an act of assembly, though it
purports to have been printed by the law
44 11 Cl. & F. 85, 115.
45 See Inge v. Murphy, 10 Ala. 885; Hanrick v. An-
drews, 9 Porter, 9; Allen v. Watson, 2 Hill (S. C.),
319; Simms v. Southern Express Co., 38 Ga. 129;
People v. Calder, 30 Mich. 85; People v. Lambert, 5.
Mich. 349: Whitesides v. Poole, 9 Rich. 68; McDeed
v. MeDeed, 67 II. 545; Taylor v. Bank of Illinois, 7
Mon. 585; Taylor's Adm'r v. Bank, 5 Leigh, 471;-
Vaughn v. Griffith, 16 Ind. 353; Paine v. Lake Erie,
etc. R. Co., 31 Ind. 283; Merrifield y. Robbins, 8
Gray, 150.
46 1 Dallas, 458.
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printers of Virginia, is not as good evidence
as a sworn copy compared with the rolls or
an exemplifleation under the great seal, but
these modes of authentication are likewise in-
ferior to the original law itself. If the plaint-
iff in error had been sued in Virginia, this
printed book of the acts of assembly would
then, unquestionably, have been good evi-
dence; and I can discover no satisfactory
reason why, as he is sued here, the same ev-
idence should not be received at least prima
facie" This case was decided in 1789, two
years prior to the passage of the act of Con-
gress providing for the authentication of rec-
ords. 47 But since that act, the same doctrine
has been maintained, and in the face of the
objection that laws should be authenticated
in the manner provided for in that act.48 And
a volume of laws of a foreign government,
transmitted by that government to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, will be
admitted as evidence of the laws of such gov-
ernment, in the courts of the United States,
without further authentication. 49
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
47 Rev. Statutes of U.. S. (1878) sec. 905.
48 Kean v. Rice, 12 S. & R. 203; Raynham v. Canton,
3 Pick. 293; State v. Stade, 1 D. Chipm. 303; Danforth
T. Reynolds, 1 Vt. 265; State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60;
Cox v. Robinson, 2 Stew. & P. 91; Poindexter's
Exr's v. Barker, 2 Hayw. 173; Hanrick v. Andrews, 9
Porter, 9; Mullen v. Morris, 2 Pa. St. 85; Young v.
Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cranch, 388; Biddis v. James,
6 Binney, 321, 327. Per contra, Packard v. Hill, 2
Wend. 411; Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 475; State v.
Twitty, 2 Hawks, 441. See, too, Kinney v. Hosea, 3
Harr. (Del.) 78.
49 Dauphin v. United States, 6 Ct. of Claims, S21;
Rothschild v. United States, 6 Ct. of Claims, 204.
VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT - ESCROW -
DELIVERY - ESTOPPEL - PLEADING -
ALTERATION.
ROBBINS v. MAGEE.
Supreme Court of Indiana, November 29, 1881.
Where a grantor, by an ordinary warranty deed,
without conditions or limitations therein expressed,
onveys land to certain grantees named in the deed,
without using language indicating that they take as
rustees, but at the same time executes an agreement
with the grantees which shows that they take as
trustees, and as such are to sell the land and apply the
proceeds to the payment of the grantor's creditors,the
transaction must be regarded as a composition agree-
ment between the grantor and his creditors, and not
as a voluntary assignment.
2. Where a deed is placed in the hands of a third
party, to be delivered only upon condition, and such
party, before compliance with said condition, wrong-
fully delivers the same, the delivery is without force,
and passes no title to the grantes in the deed, and the
grantor may assail and overthrow it.
3. To constitute a valid estoppel by conduct, there
must be knowledge on the part of the party sought to
be estopped, and a want of knowledge on the part
of the party relying upon the estoppel.
4. An answer which attempts to plead an estoppel
by conduct, must show that the defendant relied
upon the plaintiff's representations or conduct, was
influenced thereby, and was ignorant of the truth.
In pleading an estoppel,the facts must be stated with
fullness and certainty.
5. No affirmative defense can be maintained upon a
deed which has been fraudulently altered Uy the party
who made the alteration.
6. But one who purchases in good faith from such
grantee, without knowledge of the alteration of the
deed, and acting upon representations of the grantor
in the altered deed, obtains a good title.
Appeal from the Rush Circuit Court.
Adams & Michener, B. F. Love, C. Cambeon and
Sluth d Study, for appellant; Miller & Gavin, C.
& J1. IT. Ewing and W. B. Wilson, for appellees.
ELLIOTT, C. J., delivered the opinion of the
court:
This action was commenced by the appellants
in the Decatur Circuit Court, and the venue after-
wards changed to the Rush Circuit Court.
The complaint of the appellants was in four
paragraphs. In the first paragraph it was alleged,
that the appellant was the owner of certain real
estate on the 17th of December, 1871, and of a
large amount of personal property; that, on that
day, he executed a deed of assignment to Ralph
Magee for said real estate, for the benefit of his,
appellant's, creditors; that, at the same time, a
written agreement was executed by appellant and
the appellees; that at the time of said assignment,
the appellant was in failing circumstances, and
largely indebted to other persons, not parties to
the aforesaid agreement, nor included within the
list of creditors in the said assignment, and that
the said assignment was made under the act con-
cerning voluntary assignments, approved March
5th, 1859. Copies of the deed of assignment and
of the agreement executed contemporaneously
with it, are set forth. It is charged that the as-
signment was invalid for the following reasons:
It was not made for the benefit of all of the cred-
itors of the assignor; it was not accompanied by
a schedule containing a particular enumeration of
all the personal property assigned; the schedule
was not sworn to before an officer authorized to
administer oaths, as required by the act afore-
said; that the deed was not properly acknowl-
edged; that the deed was not recorded accordinig
to law, and that the trustees did not take the oath
required by statute. The second paragraph al-
leges, in substance, that the deed of assignment
was delivered as an escrow to one Scobey, to be
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